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PREFACE
This report is an executive summary o° the final report on a study
of the comparative program costs associated with use of various stand-
ardized spacecraft for Air Force Space Test Program missions to be flown
on the space shuttle during the 1980-1990 time period. The first phase
of the study considered a variety of procurement mixes composed of
existing or programmed NASA standard spacecraft designs and a new Air
Forc9 standard spacecraft design. The results were briefed to a joint
NASA/Air Force audience on July 11, 1976. The second phase considered
additional procurement options using an upgraded version of an existing
NASA design. The results of both phases are summarized in this report.
The final report of the study, R-2099/2-NASA, Standard Spacecraft Eco-
nomic Analysis, Vol. 2: Final Report of Findings and Conclusions, is
available from The Rand Corporation as a companion report.
The results of the study should be useful to NASA and Air Force
space program offices involved in operational or experimental missions.
They should also be of interest to those concerned with the determina-
tion of the shuttle tariff rate structure or with shuttle operations,
because the impact of a variety of tariff rates is examined.
Although the study examines procurement options that affect both
NASA and Air Force programs, the results should not be interpreted as
representing official views or policies of NASA or the Air Force.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was to examine the relative costs of
using one or more of several possible standard spacecraft for Air Force
Space Test Program missions during the initial 10-year operational
period of the space shuttle. During the first phase of our study we
considered the Space Test Program Standard Satellite (STPSS)--a design
proposed by the Space Test Program Office of the Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), and two NASA candidates--the
Applications Explorer Mission spacecraft (AEM) and the Multimission
Modular Spacecraft (MMS). After the initial study phase was completeo
a fourth candidate was introduced--a larger and more capable AEM (L-AEM)
configured by the Boeing Company under NASA sponsorship to meet specifi-
cations jointly agreed upon by NASA and the Air Force. The evaluation
of that spacecraft is alg a included in the results of this study and
procurement options derived using all four spacecraft are compared for
the Space Test Program missions. The study was funded by NASA and con-
ducted with the full cooperation of both NASA and the Air Force.
In the past the Space Test Program Office has procured spacecraft
as required for specific missions. Generally, that has meant that a new
spacecraft was designed and developed for each new mission. The Space
Test Program Office has tried to reduce the cost of these spacecraft by
requiring that: (1) the contractor use flight-proven components when-
ever possible; (2) a minimum amount of demonstration testing be done;
(3) high technology solutions be avoided; and (4) the institutional
aspects of the program, e.g., program office size, be minimized. To
date the Space Test Program Office has been very successful in de-
veloping spacecraft at a cost substantially lower than the experience
of more traditional programs would lead one to a >ect.
Recognizing that a standard spacecraft produced in accord with
these principles could generate substantial savings, the Space Test
Program Office contracted for a spacecraft configuration study by TRG'(1)
which was used as the baseline configuration for this study. Associated
studies of other aspects of the STPSS operation and design were also
available. (2-4)
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Concurrent with the Air Force activity, NASA has for the past six
years been working on another standard spacecraft configuration, the
MMS. 
(5) 
Many of the low-cost aspects of the Space Test Program concept
are a part of the MMS design and operational philcsophy as well. The
principal distinction is an emphasis by NASA on spacecraft modularity,
retrieval, and on-orbit servicing that would be possible with a space
shuttle. The resulting spacecraft design has capabilities exceeding
those necessary for the Air Force Space Test Program missions. The MMS
program is ahead of the STPSS chronologically--some of its components
have been developed, the design is firm, and contractor bids have been
received. Thus the MMS will be developed at no cost to the Air Force,
and it is reasonable to ask whether both the MMS and STPSS are needed.
The availability of the AEM further complicates the issue. The
AE4 is the furthest along in the development cycle. Boeing is under
contract to NASA to develop and build AEM spacecraft for the Heat
Capacity Mapping Mission (HCMM) and the Stratospheric Aerosol Gaseous
Experiment (SAGE), and again, NASA is emphasizing low-cost spacecraft
design. (6) Although the AEM is designed specifically for two missions,
it uses a modular concept that makes it suitable as a standard
spacecraft.
An additional complication is that the AEM can be upgraded to
perform some or all projected Space Test Program missions, depending
on the kind of attitude control subsystem used. The question, then,
of which spacecraft would enable the Space Test Program Office to meet
its mission responsibilities at the lowest cost requires a comparative
analysis of program costs. This report presents an executive summary
of such an analysis. Section II presents study objectives and guide-
lines, and Sec. III discusses the Space Test Program mission model.
The results of the cost analysis are summarized in Sec. IV, where esti-
mates of spacecraft nonrecurring and recurring costs and the costs of
the various launch options are presented. Section V summarizes the
program costs, and the results of the sensitivity analyses conducted
and the conclusions of the study are presented in Sec. VI.
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H. OLJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES
The two objectives of this st ,idy were to develop internally con-
sistent cost estimates for the AEM, L-AEM, STPSS, and MMS spacecraft
and, using these estimates, to determine the variation in program cost
for a variety of spacecraft procurement options capable of performing
the Space Test Program missions during 1980-1990. The emphasis is on
relative, not absolute, accuracy in the estimates developed.
The study guidelines directed hat we use the spacecraft configura-
tions as determined by Goddard Space Flight Center (GSrC) for the KMS,
TRW for the ST? SS, and Boeing for the L -AEM and AEM. Of the four, the
AEM has the least capability. It is about 3 ft in diameter, has a 150 lb
payload capability, and is limited to operating altitudes of less than
1000 n mi. The L-AEM design is a derivative of the AEM that is larger
(5 ft in diameter) and has greater data rate, power, and payload capa-
bilities, (7) The nominal payload of the L-AEM is the same as the STPSS,
1000 lb. Both the L-AEM and STPSS can be procured in three different
configurations--a spinning version (L-AEM-S or STPSS-S), a baseline or
low-cost three-axis stabilized version (L-AEM-BL or STPSS-LC), and a
three-axis stabilized precision version (L-AEM-P or STPSS-P). The MMS
is the most sophisticated of the four standard spacecraft considered in
the study. It has a modular design that allows on-orbit servicing and
reuse, while the AEM, L-AEM, and STPSS are expendable. The MMS has a
payload capability of about 4000 lb and can be operated up to geo-
synchronous altitude.
Space Test Program payloads described in Current STF Payloads (the
so-called "bluebook") (8) are considered representative of those that
would be flown during the period 1980-1990.
All spacecraft are compatible with the use of solid rockets for
orbit translation, which usually requires spin stabilization. The AEM,
L-AEM, and STPSS are designed with that in mind. The MMS normally uses
a hydrazine propulsion module or the Interim Upper Stage (IUS) for orbit
translation in a three-axis stabilized attitude, but according to GSFC
it can also be spin stabilized for orbit translation.
Space Test Program missions are intended to be flown as second-
ary payloads, which implies that Space Test Program payloads would
rely on solid rocket kick stages, other than the IUS, for orbit trans-
lation from the nominal shuttle parking orbit (150 n mi) rather than
change the shuttle orbit altitude and inclination to meet the payload
requirements.
Nominally, two Space Test Program flights per year would be flown
with a minimum of one flight per year. All missions in the study are
launched using the space shuttle with no on-orbit servicing or payload
Number Type
Orbit
(n mi)
Inclination
(deg)
Launch
Range
Percentage
of Payloads
No. of
Payloads
1-S Sun-synchronous, 250-300 98.4- Western 17 20
sun-oriented circular
1-E Sun-synchronous, 250-300 98.4 Western 28 32
earth-oriented circular
2 Elliptical 7000 x 200 Polar Western 28 32
3 Geosynchronous, 19,372 Low Eastern 8 9
sun-oriented circular (28.5)
4 -- 10,000 Low Eastern 4 5
circular (28.5)
5 12 hr 21,000 Y 900 63.4 Eastern 7 7
6 Geosyncrronous, 19,372 Low Eastern 2 3
earth-oriented circular
7 -- 3200 x 150 30 Eastern 2 3
8 -- 180 circular Polar Western 2 3
c
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III. SPACE TEST PROGRAM MISSION MODEL
As indicated in Table 1, the Space Tes t_ Program missions (8) are
divided into eight different orbits that distinguish among orbit
altitude, inclination, and spacecraft orientation. The first orbit
(1-S ar e? I-E) is a low earth orbit with an altitude of about 250-300
n mi. The missions of this orbit are categorized according to whether
they are sun-oriented or earth-orient,>d. Forty-five percent of the
Space Test Program payloads fly in this orbit. The second orbit is a
highly elliptical one (7000 by 200 r. mi) in which 28 percent of the
3pgce Test Program payloadL fly. The missions in both of these orbits
are launched from the Western Test Range (WTR). The missions flown
frorA the WTR (orbits 1, 2, and 8) represent about 75 percent of the
Table 1
SPACE TEST PROGRAM MISSION CATEGORIES
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Space Test Program payloads. The missions flown out of the Eastern
Test Range (ETR) all require large orbit translations, e.g., up to
geosynchrounus- The last column of Table 1 shows the number of Space
Test Program payloads that will fly in each of the orbits during the
1980-1990 period. The total number of payloads In the nominal case
is 114.
Table 2 lists the number and percentage of the Space Test Program
missions that each of the eight standard spacecraft configurations
can accommodate. The measures of spacecraft c.pability used in making
this assignment include: payload weight, pointing accuracy, power
availability, stability, orientation, and data transmission rate.
Table 2
SPACECRAif MISSION CAPABILITY
Number Percentage
of	 of Total
Spacecraft
	
Payloads Payloads
AEM (150 lb, <1000 n mi)	 10	 22
L-AEM-S	 12	 26
L-AEM-BL (<1.000 n mi)	 13	 28
L-AEM-P	 46	 100
STPSS-S	 12	 26
STPSS-LC	 41	 89
STPSS-P	 46	 100
MMS	 46	 101)
The number of payloads accommodated by the AEM and L-AEM-BL is
limited primarily by altitude limitatiuns. The spinning configurations
are limited by the number of Space Test Program payloads chat can be
spin stabilized. The three precision spacecraft configurations (L-AEM-P,
STPSS-P, and MMS) can accommodate all of the Space Test Program missions.
i-7-
IV. SPACECRAFT AND LAUNCH COSTS
RECURRING COSTS
The estimated unit 1 ^_osts for each of the spacecraft considered
in the study are show: 7n Table 3. The intent was to provide estimates
Lhat would reflect relative differences in the size, complexity, and
capability of the spacecraft as currently specified, while remaining
consistent with the current cost experience of programs actually under-
way, i.e., the AEM and MMS. The method adopted w " 3 to develop a model
calibrated to reflect AEM experience and to use conventional scaling
techniques for extrapolation from that base. The estimates shown in
Table 3 include integration of the components into subsystems, system
integration and test, program management, reliability and quality
assurance, etc. No allowance for profit was included.
Table 3
ESTIMATED UNIT 1 COST
(In millions of
1976 dollars)
	
AE4 ....................	 2.3
L•-AEM
	
Spin ................. 	 3.5
	
Baseline .............	 4.8
	
Precision ............	 5.7
STPSS
	
Spin .................	 4.6
	
Low-cost .... ........	 S.7
	
Precision ............	 6.9
MMS
	
Basic ................	 8.9
	
SPS-I ................ 	 9.4
In deriving these unit 1 costs for the AEM and MMS configurations
we assume: that the AEM uses the SAGE attitude control system and a
f	 ,
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SGLS-compatible S-band communications system; and that the MMS also
has an SGLS-compatible communications package as well as a solar array.
The area and cost of the array on the L-AEM and STPSS three-axis space-
craft and the 11MS are varied according to mission requirements. Space-
craft unit costs are also varied for different production rates and
quantities.
NONRECURRING COSTS
Nonrecurring costs were estimated for the STPSS and L-AEM only;
for the other spacecraft those costs would not be borne by USAF and
therefore would be irrelevant in comparisons of USAF outlays. The SAMSO
cost model (9)
 provided the basic estimating equations, which were derived
from a sample of up to 28 space programs over the period 1959-1972. Some
spacecraft were deleted from the sample because they were developed
"under tight monetary constraints and under a philosophy that required
the use of proven technology." STPSS is precisely such a program, so
the output of the SAMSO model was modified to fit the Space Test Program
Office philosophy. In addition, j.t has been assumed that a qualifica-
tion test model would be desirabl -t, and the nonrecurring cost estimates
for both the S:rSS and L-AEM reflect that assumption.
For the L-AEM nonrecurring costs the basic estimate by Boeing was
scaled up to include a test model, bur as shown in Table 4 the difference
Tab le 4
SPACECRAFT NONRECURRING COSTS
(In millions of 1976 dollars)
Estimates Basedl Estimates Based
on SAMSO- Model I on Boeing Study
Spacecraft	 I S'PPSS I L-AEM I	 L-AEM
Spin 15.9 -- --
Low-cost (baseline) 20.7 18.0 8.6
Precision 23.4 19.6 9.1
Spin + low-cost 25.3 -- --
Spin + precision 28.1 23.0 11.3
Low-cost + precision 26.1 25.3 11.9
Spin + low-cost + precision 30.9 28.7 14.5
t	 ti
-9-
between the L-AEM and STPSS nonrecurring costs is striking. When esti-
mated in the same manner as the STPSS, the differences are far less.
The impact of the discrepancy between the estimates on the issue of
spacecraft selection is examined in the sensitivity analysis (Sec. V).
LAUNCH COSTS
Launch costs are an important component of total program cost, and
it was essential to determine whether their inclusion would affect the
rank ordering of spacecraft alternatives. " 7, .nce both the cost per
shuttle launch and t'. ►e way in which that cost will be allocated among
users are still uncertain, several possibilities were considered (Table 5).
A nominal cost of $15.4 million was assumed for most cases but the effect
of an increase to $30 million was also considered.
Launch costs could be allocated among missions sharing a space
sh+:,`le flight in a variety of ways, e.g., on the basis of weight or by
pre ".urinary tariff schedules formulated by NASA. The NASA tariff sched-
ule available for the first phase of the study allocated the shuttle
cost on the basic of length, weight, inclination, and altitude. In this
equation, weight is the least important variable and for the Spare Test
Program missions, inclination-is the most important. A modified NASA
tariff schedule (Table 5), proposed since the earlier phase, prorated
the launch costs on the basis of either weight or length, whichever
gives the higher cost.
Another possibility is that the primary user might pay the entire
cost and a secondary user traveling on a space-available basis might
pay only a service charge--shown here as $1 million. All of these
possibilities were included in the analysis.
I
I
I	 1
$1 million + Mission payload weight ($15.4
a million)
Shuttle payload weightBy weight
if
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Table 5
LAUNCH COSTS
Shuttle Launch Cost
Allocation	 Formula for Allocating Shuttle Launch Costs
Using the modified
NASA tariff
$1 million per launch
SRU - .00215L + 0.2381.2
+ .000203W - .00000000169W2
- .000122I + .00422I2
+ .00109A + .000232A2
Mission payload weight ($15.4
a million)
Shuttle payload weight
or
Mission payload length 015.4 a million)
Shuttle bay length
whichever gives the higher cost
Using service charge only
Using the NASA tariffb
NOTE: The IUS cost is assumed to be $4.3 million per launch whenever it is
used as a kick stage.
a Space shuttle costs of $30 million per launch were also used.
bSRU stands for service rendered units, which may exceed 100 for some com-
binations of inputs, but when it does it is truncated at 100. It represents
a percentage of the shuttle cost that is charged for a specific launch. The
units of the equation are: L, length in ft; W, weight in lb; I, inclination
in deg; and A, altitude in n mi.
I
r	 i	 I	 I	 I	 I	 f	 (	 1
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V. PROGRAM COST
Program cost for a variety of procurement options, each capable
of performing all of the Air Force Space Test Program missions, is used
as the principal measure for distinguishing among these procurement
options. The analysis was done in two phases. In the first phase,
procurement options using the AEM, STPSS, and MMS spacecraft were com-
pared. In the second phase, additional procurement options using the
L-AEM spacecraft design, which became available partly as a result of
the outcome of the first phase, were evaluated.
NOMINAL CASE
We defined a nominal case as a baseline for estimating the cost
to carry out the Space Test Program missions during the 1980-1990
period, and a number of excursions from that baseline were made to test
the sensit _' vity of the results to ap ;umptions about the number of pay-
loads, payloa,4 4 per spacecraft, etc. The nominal case includes all
three versions of the STPSS. The nominal program size is 114 payloads
with a maximum of 6 payloads per spacecraft. In keeping with the Space
Test Program Office philosophy that its payloads always have secondary
status, all missions are launched by the shuttle to a 150 n mi parking
orbit; solid rocket kick stages are used tc translate the Space Test
Program payloads into the proper orbits. Both ETR and WTR launches of
the shuttle are considered. For the nominal case, it is assumed that
the shuttle cost of $15.4 million is prorated by weight and that a
service charge of $1 million per launch is imposed.
The number of spacecraft that would need to be procured for each
of four different procurement options is shown in Table 6. The four
options are an all-STPSS case, an all-MMS case, and two mixed cases--
AEM/STPSS and AEM /MMS. An option consisting of all three types of
spacecraft was considered, but it would not be cost-effective to have
both the STPSS and MMS in the same option. Either spacecraft alone can
provide the full range of capabi'Lity necessary for the Space Test Pro-
gram missions but at different costs. 	 i
t.
^I
1I
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Table 6
NUMBER OF SPACECRAFT
(Nominal case)
Spacecraft
Type
Procurement Options
STPSS MMS AEM/STPSS AEM/MMS
AEM 0 0 3 4
STPSS-S 0 0 0 0
STPSS-LC 19 0 16 0
STPSS-P 5 0 5 0
MIS 0 24 0 20
Total 24 24 24 24
The STPSS-S configuration is not procured in the nominal case,
because there are only a few payloads that can be spin stabilized, and
they are distributed over the eight different orbits in such a way
that it is always more costly to use the STPSS-S than to place more
payloads on the STPSS-LC or STPSS-P. When larger programs are con-
sidered, the STPSS-S configuration is included in the procurement mix.
The costs associated with these procurement options are shown in
Table 7, broken out by spacecraft, kick stages, and launch operations.
Table 7
PROCUREMENT COSTS IN NOMINAL CASE
($ millions)
Cost Item
Procurement Options
STPSS MMS AEM/STPSS AEM/MMS
Spacecraft 167 190 155 172
Kick stages
(solids) 4 6 4 5
Launch
(100% prorated) 51 67 51 63
Total 222 263 210 240
-13-
The cost of the all-solid kick stages is nearly insignificant (about
2 percent of the total). Launch cost represents about 25 percent of
the total cost.
The lowest-cost procurement option is the AEM/STPSS combination,
but the pure-STPSS option is within 10 percent of its cost. Given the
uncertainties of the various spacecraft in this study, we consider pro-
grwn options having costs within 10 percent of each other as indistinguish-
able. Consequently, for the nominal case both the AEM/STPSS and pure
STPSS are preferred alternatives. The pure MMS is not a good option for
the Space Test Program missions, because it offers more capability than
is needed for most missions and that capability must be paid for.
PAYLOAD VARIATIONS
The results of the nominal case can be considered valid only if
they obtain for conditions other than those established somewhat arbi-
trarily. To test their sensitivity to the original assumptions, sev-
eral other cases were examined as illustrated it Table 8. Of the cases
shown, maximum number of payloads per spacecraft, payloads in the Space
Test Program, allocation criteria for launch costs, and shuttle costs
were found to be the most important in terms o` program cost.
Table 8
SENSITIVITY EXCURSION'S
(Nominal case)
Using Current Spacecraft Configurations 1
E
1. Maximum number of payloads per spacecraft: 6-13
2. Size of the Space Test Program: 92-228 payloads
3. Type of kick stage: solids, IUS-solids combination
4. Percent of the shuttle costs prorated: 0-100 percent
5. Criteria for allocating the shuttle costs: weight-
NASA tariff	 1
6. Shuttle cost: $15.4 million-$30 million 	
I
7. STPSS nonrecurring cost: nominal costs (Table 4)--
30 percent lower
1
300
200
PROGRAM
COST
millions
of
dollars)	 1W
0
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER SPACECRAFT
STPSS
MMS
AEM-STPSS
AEM-MMS
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The variation of total program cost with maximum number of pay-
loads per spacecraft is illustrated in Fig. 1, where it can be seen
that as the maximum number of payloads increases above 10, the ability
to distinguish between the procurement options on the basis of program
cost disappears. The total program cost is about 30 percent loner than
in the nominal case (maximum number of pa y loads of 6) when the number
of payloads is allowed to increase to 13. This trend was found to be
true across a wide number of excursions.
Fig. 1—Effect of the maximum number of payloads
per spacecraft (nominal case)
Figure 2 illustrates the variation in program cost as a function
of the Space Test Program size. Here we have allowed the program size
to double for a total of 228 payloads to see if economies of scale
might preferentially benefit the MMS and thereby alter the ordering of
the procurement options. As shown, no such effect was found. The or-
dering of the various procurement options remained unchanged while the
program cost increased nearly linearly.
^	 ^	 r 
Now
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I
Sao
400
PROGRAM
COST	 30D
Imillions
a	 20D
dollars 1
10D
90 100	 1141	 200	 Z50
SPACE TEST PROGRAM SIZE (NUMBER Of PAYLOADS)
Fig. 2—Effect of Space Test Program size
(nom i na 1 case)
LAUNCH COST VARIATIONS
Table 9 displays the program costs for the nominal case where the
shuttle launch cost is assumed to be $15.4 million prorated among users
on the basis of payload weight. Excursions were performed to test the
sensitivity of the rank ordering of program costs to shuttle launch
cost and the procedure adopted for allocating shuttle costs among users.
These results are also shown in Table 9, where for ease of reading all
costs more than 10 percent clove the lowest cost in each row are in
parentheses.
In looking at the other cases, it is clear that increasing the
shuttle cost to $30 million per launch has no effect on the relative
results. Assuming that Space Test Program payloads get a free ride
on the shuttle and pay only a service charge of $1 million per launch
does not change the results either.
The effect of the two NASA-proposed tariff schedules is also shown.
I
	
	 In the case called NASA tariff, where launch cost is allocated on a
basis of payload length and weight, altitude, and orbital inclination,
relative costs are unchanged from the first two cases. The results for
the modified NASA tariff cose were somewhat different; both the MMS and
AEM/MMS options have relatively higher program costs beca+. 4 the aver-
age length of the spacecraft-payload combinations for these options is
greater than for the options using the STPSS.
i-16-
Table 9
EFFECT OF SHUTTLE COST AND TARIFF SCHEDULES 
Case
No. of
Payloads
in
Programs
Max. No.
of Payloads
per
Spacecraft
Program Cost
($ millions)
STPSS MMS AEM/STPSS AEM/MMS
114 13 160 162 157 156
Shuttle cost 114 6 222 (263) 210 (240)
$15.4 million 228 13 244 247 244 240
228 6 373 (418) 342 (392)
114 13 181 189 178 183
Shuttle cost = 114 6 249 (306) 237 (279)
$30 million 228 13 279 290 279 284
228 6 424 (489) 391 (461)
114 13 139 135 136 129
Service charge 114 6 195 (220) 183 201
of $1 million only 228 13 209 204 209 196
228 6 322 (347) 293 (323)
114 13 202 204 199 198
114 6 297 (342) 286 (321)NASA tariff 228 13 315 316 333 321
228 6 514 (558) 490 538
114 13 161 (181) 156 (173)
Modified 114 6 226 (277) 210 (258)
NASA tariff 228 13 244 (267) 240 (265)
228 6 (376) (454) 339 (432)
a For a given row, program costs within 10 percent of the lowest value are
not in parentheses.
The implications of the foregoing analysis for spacecraft selection
that has included the AEM, STPSS, and MMS may be summarized as follows:
1. When the upper limit on the numbet of payloads that can be
assigned to a spacecraft is ten or more, program costs are
essentially the same in all cases.
2. When the number of payloads per spacecraft is limited to 6,
the STPSS and AEM/STPSS offer lowest program costs in vir-
tually all cases.
3. When shuttle charges are determined largely by payload length,
as is the case when the modified NASA shuttle tar! 	 rate is
used, the AEM-STPSS combination has the lowest program cost.
-^
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4. Given the stipulated AEM, STPSS, and MMS capabilities, the
uncertainties in the Air Force Space Test Program mission
model, and the uncertainties in the shuttle tariff schedule,
none of the alternatives considered offers a clear-cut ad-
vantage over the others, although those options that include
the STPSS are generally preferred.
UPGRADED AEM
As an additional excursion, the possibility of modifying some
spacecraft designs to give them greater capability was considered.
Specific modifications considered include: increasing the STPSS pay-
load capability to 1500 lb; increasing the AEM payload capability to
300 lb, and changing the AEM capability to allow sun orientation and/or
geosynchronous altitude operation. Of these, only the last promised a
sizable impact on program cost because of the increased number of pay-
loads that could be captured (from 22 to 72 percent of the total) even
with the AEM's limited power, data rate and payload weight capabilities.
To obtain this improved performance, the reaction control system of the
AEM needs to be upgraded. As a first-order approximation, the cost o
the AEM was increased sufficiently to allow the use of the STPSS cold-
gas reaction control system. This configuration is referred to hence-
forth as the upgraded AE14.
Table 10 compares the cost of the upgraded AEM/STPSS and upgraded
AEM/MMS options with those considered in the previous nominal case. in
Table 10
EFFECT OF THE UPGRADED AEMa
No.	 of
Payloads
in
Max.	 No.
of Payloads
per
Program Cost
	 ($ millions)
Upgraded- Upgraded-
Case P- cgram Spacecraft STPSS MMS AIIa ; STPSS AEM/MMS AEM/STPSS AI'M/MMS
114 13 (160) (162) (157) (156) (148) 99
Nominal 114 6 (222) (263) (210) (240) (172) 146228 13 (244) (247) (244) (240) (233) 175
228 6 (373) (418) (342) (392) 298 294
Increased esti- 114 13 (160) (162) (157) (156) (175) 121
mates of 114 6 (222) (263) (210) (240) (215) 183
upgraded ALM 228 13 244 247 244 240 (281) 231
cost 228 6 373 (418) 342 (392) 368 371
afor a given row, program costs within 10 percent of the lowest value are no: in parentheses.
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that excursion the upgraded AEM/MMS option has program costs about
20 percent less than those cf the other procurement options. Increas-
ing the cast estimates for the upgraded AE`'! by doubling the recurring
cost and adding a $10 million nonrecurring cost also resulted in the
upgraded AEM/MMS being the preferred procurement option. The prin-
cipal reasons for this are: (1) with the additional performance ca-
pabilities, the relatively low-cost upgraded AEM is a substitute for
the more expo--live STPSS on nearly all missions that do not require
precisio-i accuracy, and (2) when the upgraded AEM is used in combina-
tion with the MMS, the nonrecurring cost of the STPSS is not incurred.
In this case, an upgraded AEM spacecraft with costs of that mag-
nitude would probably be a redundant design having greater payload
weight, power, and data rate capabilities. Because of the potential
vaZue of such a spacecraft it seemed highly desirable that an upgraded
AEM having many of the above characteristics be designed and evaluated
for use in the Air Force's Space Test Program.
LARGF-DIAMETER SHUTTLE-LAUNCHED AEM (L-AEM)
Under NASA sponsorship, Boeing undertook a conf`euration and cost
study for a 5 ft diameter AEM that would be designed for shuttle launch
and would include the capabilities ascribed above to the upgraded AEM. (7)
Using the same approach for comparing alternative procurement options
that was used earlier, Table 11 presents the program costs for four
procurement options including the L-AEM and compares them with the
other options for the nominal case. It is shown that all of the pro-
curement options that use the L -AEM are preferred over those made up
of the three original spacecraft. The lowest-cost L-AEM option is
about 15-20 percent less costly than the lowest-cost non- -AEM option,
and that assumes that the nonrecurring cost of the L-AEM would be paid
for by the Air F-rce. If the L-AEM is developed by NASA, the L-AEM
options are even more attractive.
Table 11 also shows the effect of higher nonrecurring costs for
the L-AEM than that assumed in the nominal case. For this excursion,
the t.EM/STPSS option is also attractive for some conditions, but over-
all the L-AEM options are preferred.
1 4
1-19-
Table 11
EFFECT OF THE L-AEMa
No. of
Payloads
In
Max.	 No.
of Payloads
per
Program Cost ($ millions)
AEM/
Case Program Spacecraft STPSS ?LMS AEM/STPSS AEM/3415 L-AEM AEM/L-ALM L-Ai21/MS L-AM/MS
114 13 !_'b0) (162) (157) (156) 135 133 139 132
Nominal 114 6 (222) (263) (210) (240) 186 181 187 186228 13 (244) (247) (244) (240) 198 208 212 199
228 6 (373) (418) (342) (392) 306 297 (373) 323
Nigher L-AEN 114 13 (160) (162) 157 156 148 146 150 143
nonrecurring 114 6 (122) (263) 210 (240) 199 195 200 197
cost 228 13 (244) (247) (244) (240) 212 222 223 211228 6 (373) (418) 342 (;s2) 320 311 (384) 335
-For a given row, program costa within 10 percent of the lowest value are not in parentheses.
Earlier it was shown that an upgraded AEM/MMS procurement option
provided the lowest program cost. The upgraded AEM differs from the
-AEM in that it has the payload weight, power, and data rate limita-
tions of the original AEM, while the L-AEM capabilities are greater in
all of these areas. Table 12 compares the program costs for the four
L-AEM options and the two upgraded AEM options. Again, the upgraded
AEM/MMS procurement option is preferred but by less of a cost margin
than before. This result occurs for the same reason as stated earlier
(p. 18) except in this case the cheaper, upgraded AEM displaces the L-AEM
rather than the STPSS. The limited capability of the upgraded AEM makes
Table 12
COMPARISON OF THE L-AEH AND UPGRADED AEMa
No. of
Payloads
Max. No.
of Payloads
Program Cost ($ millions)
AEM/
in per AEM/ L-AEM/ L-AEM/ Upgraded- Upgraded-
Case Program Spacecraft L-AEM T.-AEM MMS 4M AI:M/STPSS AEMPKMS
114 13 (135) (133) ( 1 1 9) (132) (148) 99
Nouinal 114 6 (185) (.81) (187) (186) (172) 146228 13 (198) 208) (212) (199) (233) 175
228 6 306 297 (373) 322 298 294
114 13 (135) (135) (139) (134) (167) 113
With AEA! 114 6 185 186 187 (196) (209) 175
redundancy 228 13 198 217 212 217 (275) (224)
228 6 306 318 (373) 337 (363) (369)
`for a given row, program costs within 10 percent of the lowest value are not in
parentheses.
`I
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this a tenuous conclusion in view of the possibilities of growth in the
payload power and weigz!t rc>cpuirements of the Space Test Program mission
model; that growth could quickly decrease any program cost advantage
that the upgraded AEM/MMS option might have.
Current Air Force require ments for new spacecraft include min-
imizing single-point failure modes. The L-AM has a redundant design,
while the A I and upgraded AEM do not. Illustrated in Table 12 are
the results of an excursion where it was assumed thac whenever an AEM
or upgraded ALM is included in an option, two spacecraft would be flown.
This would make the AEM and upgraded AEM more comparable to the L-AEM
in terms of the redundancy. For the case of 114 payloads and 6 payloads
per spacecraft, a number of the L-AEM options are within the lower ten
percent cost category; for a mission model with 228 payloads, the L-AEM
options are clearly preferred over the upgraded AEM/MMS option.
Considering that the program cost advantage indicated for the up-
graded AEM/MS option over the L-AE4 options could be lost in either
of the two ways mentioned above (that is, by growth in the power and/or
weight requirements of the Air Force Space Test Program mission model,
or by the spacecraft desigh requirements for minimizing single-point
failure modes), use conclude that the L-AEV spacecraft, or some very
similar design, would provide a aasis for minim=..i.ng the Air Force's
Space Test Program costs. The L-AEM could be used individually or in
combination with the AEM and/or the MMS.
The procurement results for the nominal case that include the
L-AEM are shown in Table 13. A comparison of these options shows that
the L-AEM-P configuration comprises about 75 percent of the bu- with
the balance being shared by the Art, L-AEM-BL and/or MMS; the L-AEM-S
is never used in the nominal case.
The distribution of the program costs for the pure L-AEM option is
shown in Fig. 3. The most significant factor is the large launch costs
for WTR launches whe!. the NASA tariff schedule is applied. The use of
the modified NASA tar -ff schedule redresses this drastic cost imbalance.
This idea was suggested by Boeing as a way cf achieving the de-
sired level of redundancy without redesigning the entire spacecraft.
Physically it is possible to have two AM spacecraft side by side
within the envelope of the L-AEM.
I	 1
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Table 13
PROCUREMENT RESULTS USING L-AEM
(Nominal case)
Number of Spacecraft
Type L-AEM AFM/L-AEM L-AEM/MMS AEM/L-AEM/MMS
AEK -- 1 -- 1
3 4
L-AEM-S -- -- -- --
L-tUX-BL 4 3 -- --
6 3 6
L-AEM-p 11 12 10 10
18 18 18 18
MMS -- --
>^^j 3-- 2
Total
16 16 14
25 24 Z24 24
13
NOTE:
E maximum number of payloads/spacecraft.
COST LAUNCH COSTS
1 Millions of
Dollars ®0% PRORATI D
Z% E3 NASA TARIFF
0 MOD!FIED NASA TARIFF
2DO
NOMINAL CASE.
	
114 PAYLOADS
6 MAX. PLISC
100
SO
0.. 
SPACECRAFT $0.4 Million
	
130 Million	 111.4 Mdhon	 130 Million
SHUTTLE	 SHUTTLE,	 SHUTTLE	 SHUTTLE
	
WESTERN TEST RANGE LAUNCH	 EASTERN TEST RANGE LAUNCH
-	 COSTS	 COSTS
Fig, 3--Distribution of pfogrom costs
(L-AEM option)
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Four major conclusions have been drawn from this study. First,
program cost does not provide a basis for choosing among the AEM, STPSS,
and MALS spacecraft given their present designs. Only when the modified
NASA tariff schedule was used for allocating the shuttle launch cost
did the STPSS options become preferred; with the uncertainty in the
appropriateness of this tariff schedule, this case does not provide
sufficient basis for recommending development of the STPSS.
Second, the availability of the L-AEM spacecraft, or sane very
similar design, would provide a basis for minimizing the cost of the
Air Force's Space Test Program. The L-AEM could be used individually
or in combination with the AEM and/or MMS as the missions require.
The upgraded AEM options, although having program costs similar to the
L-AEM options, provide less capability for handling growth in the Air
Force Space Test Program mission model.
Third, the program costs are very sensitive to Li.e maximum number
of payloads florin per spacecraft. An increase from 6 to 13 in the maxi-
mum number of payloads per spacecraft would result in about 30 percent
lower program cost; the major p^rtion of this savings occurred by increas-
ing the maximum number of paylL-.ds to 10. An analysis of this potential
should be undertaken.
Fourth, launch costs, as determined by a variety of formulas, gen-
eraLZy did not affect the preferred procurement option, although they
substantially change the total progrorn costs. The modified NASA shuttle
tariff rate structure considered during the second phase of the study
corrects the drastic cost imbalance that the original NASA tariff im-
posed on Air Force launches from the Western Test Range. Secondary pay-
load status, an underlying assumption for the Air Force's Space Test Pro-
gram, is not yet accounted for in any of the NASA tariff rate structures
for the shuttle. Incorporation of the concept of a secondary payload
could reduce the total program cuts presented in this report, but it
probably would not affect the spacecraft procurement decision.
I	 `	 i
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